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Abstract 
In this paper, we address this policy issue using a stylised methodology that relies 
on estimates of the cash flow sensitivity of firms’ investment, as well as a 
relatively new methodology that enables us to generate a (0, 1) bounded 
measure of investment efficiency of firms, i.e., the efficiency with which firms can 
convert their sales into investment, after controlling for unobserved year- and 
industry-specific effects. Higher investment efficiency is associated with lower 
financing constraint. Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity 
in investment efficiency across firms, during a given year; the range being 0.57-
0.82. However, the average investment efficiency measure is similar across years, 
regions and NACE 2-digit industries. We also do not find discernible patterns in 
the relationship between investment efficiency and firm size, both before and 
during the financial crisis. The results suggest that while some firms are clearly 
less efficient at translating their performance into investment, broad policies 
targeting firms of a certain size, or those within a particular industry or region, 
may not successfully address the problem of financing constraint in the United 
Kingdom. The targeting of firms with financing constraints may have to be 
considerably more refined, and look at not easily observable factors such as 
credit history/events and organisational capacity of the firms. 
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis, growth has emerged as the single most important 
concern for policymakers in the United Kingdom. GDP growth has remained weak during most 
quarters, and the UK economy just emerged from its second recession since the start of the financial 
crisis. Arguably, this is largely an outcome of the transfer of private sector liabilities to the public 
sector during the crisis, the consequent increase in public sector debt, and simultaneous debt 
consolidation in both the public and private sectors. Since high public sector debt has short term 
implications for cost of borrowing, and long term implications for economic growth (Cecchetti et al., 
2011; Elmseskov and Sutherland, 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011), the policy priority of the UK 
government is to ensure sustainability of public sector debt and facilitate growth of the private sector. 
 
INSERT Figure 1 about here. 
 
 However, private sector growth in the UK has remained weak, and the popular wisdom is that 
in part this weakness reflects inability of the private sector to access credit (at least at affordable 
interest rates). As highlighted in Figure 1, monthly growth rates in the lending component of M4 has 
declined steadily since the crisis, and has remained negative since Q3 of 2010-11. But, there is little 
evidence as yet about firm-level financing constraints. The contribution of this paper is to examine the 
empirical evidence of financing constraints among a cross-section of firms in the UK, to inform the 
debate about credit market failures in the post-recession period. 
 Specifically, we use make use of stylised as well relatively new methodologies to examine the 
extent of financing constraints among firms.1 Our results based on the stylised approach, which relates 
the cash flow sensitivity of investment to financing constraints in firms, suggests that, contrary to 
popular wisdom, the average firm in our sample does not experience financing constraint; during the 
                                                          
1 Our sample, which is taken from the FAME data set does not include small firms which have been the focus of 
much of the political and policy discussions about financing constraints among British firms. This may have 
some implications for our results, because firms of different size have access to different sources of financing. It 
is well understood that small firms, in particular, are dependent largely on banks for financing investment, while 
medium firms have access to mezzanine finance, and larger firms have access to capital markets. But this is 
unlikely to affect the key insights of the paper.  
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crisis years, cash flow sensitivity of investment was negative. We then use a (relatively new) 
stochastic frontier approach to estimate the efficiency with which firms are able to translate their sales 
figures into investment, after controlling for year- (or financial crisis) and  industry-specific shocks. 
The measure of investment efficiency has a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound of 1. Firms that do 
not experience significant frictions in credit and capital markets should have an investment efficiency 
level close to 1, while those that experience significant frictions in these markets will have 
considerably lower values of investment efficiency. Our results indicate that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in investment efficiency across firms, during a given year; the range being 0.57-0.82. 
However, the average investment efficiency measure is similar across years, regions and NACE 2-
digit industries. We also do not find discernible patterns in the relationship between investment 
efficiency and firm size, both before and during the financial crisis. The results suggest that while 
some firms are clearly less efficient at translating their performance into investment, broad policies 
targeting firms of a certain size, or those within a particular industry or region, may not successfully 
address the problem of financing constraint in the United Kingdom. The targeting of firms with 
financing constraints may have to be considerably more refined. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the empirical strategy, 
and the data. The regression results are reported and discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Empirical strategy and data 
2.1 Stylised approach to modelling financing constraint 
Following the arguments of James Tobin, it is stylised that in a world without capital market 
imperfections and taxes, the investment of a firm that maximises its net worth will depend on its 
Tobin’s q (Yoshikawa, 1980). The “q” theory posits that if a firm’s investment strategies are 
fundamentally sound then investors’ valuation of the firm would be higher than the cost of the assets 
required to undertake production. Hence, if a firm’s q – the ratio of the market value of its assets to 
the replacement cost of these assets – is greater than 1 then the firm would be encouraged to invest 
further, while a value of q that is less than 1 would discourage investment. 
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 This basic model about the determinant of investment has been extended in a number of 
ways. To begin with, recent studies have taken into consideration the possibility that investment 
decisions may be affected by the demand for a firm’s output. In such cases, there is a departure from 
Hayashi’s (1982) argument that under plausible circumstances the marginal q used in Tobin’s analysis 
and the more readily observable average q are identical; 2 investment depends on output as well. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, early attempts at empirical estimation of investment functions find that, along 
with (average) q, the output level of firms have statistically significant coefficients (Abel, 1980). This 
statistically significant relationship is confirmed by more recent studies (Blundell et al., 1992; 
Cuthbertson and Gasparro, 1995). 
 It was further recognised that since capital markets are prone to failures on account of 
informational imperfections (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), it is important to take into account the factors 
that determine whether or not a firm is finance constrained. Initially, the literature focussed on the 
internal resources of the firms, with cash flows as a proxy for internal resources. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) include the firms’ cash flows in the specification, and argue that a statistically 
significant (and positive) coefficient for the cash flow variable indicates the presence of financing 
constraints.3 In other words, the regression specification is given by 
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where I is investment, X is vector of variables that captures investment opportunities, CF is cash flow, 
K is capital, and ε is the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise term. In the literature, 
this regression model has been estimated using both cross-section and panel data, with the latter 
facilitating control for firm- and year- fixed effects. The significance (and positive sign) of the 
coefficient for the cash flow variable (CF) indicates presence of financing constraints, and this is 
                                                          
2 Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that for a price taking firm in both the product and factor markets, with a linear 
homogeneous technology and linear homogeneous adjustment cost of capital, marginal q equals average q. 
3 Hubbard (1998) demonstrates that an increase in cash flows, which can be a proxy for an increase in net worth 
of the firm, leads to an increase in the optimal level of capital, given any cost of capital. Alternatively, it signals 
a reduction in internal agency problems, especially moral hazard, and hence reduces the (shadow) cost of 
capital.   
4 
 
borne out by a number of empirical studies (e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 
1990; Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick, 1998).  
 However, this approach has two significant shortcomings. First, the regression results indicate 
whether the average firm experiences financing constraint, thereby ignoring possible heterogeneity in 
the degree of financing constraints experienced by different types of firms. Second, it has been argued 
that the cash flow variable in the specification may not accurately capture the need for use of internal 
resources, and hence the extent of financing constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000). If so, 
insignificance of the coefficient of the cash flow variable may not reflect absence of financing 
constraints, i.e., the null and alternative hypotheses that lie at the heart of the analysis may no longer 
be well defined.4 In the next section, therefore, we discuss an empirical strategy that helps overcome 
the shortcomings of the stylised approach. 
 
4.2 Stochastic frontier based approach to modelling financing constraints 
To reiterate, in the stylised literature that builds on the pioneering work of Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988), a firm’s investment decisions depend only on its future prospect, which is captured 
by Tobin’s q, and perhaps also by its current and past sales (the components of vector X in equation 
1). If other firm characteristics such as cash flow have an impact on these investment decisions, the 
firm is believed to be financially constrained. In other words, in the absence of capital market 
imperfections and financing constraints, Tobin’s q and current and past sales are sufficient to 
characterise the investment decisions of the firm. 
In keeping with this, Wang (2003) and Bhaumik et al. (2012) argue that in the absence of 
agency conflicts and capital market imperfections a firm’s investment decision can be defined as 
follows: 
l𝑛 � 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1�
𝑆𝐹 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 l𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 l𝑛 �𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 � + 𝛿 l𝑛 �𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2 � + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       [2] 
                                                          
4 For example, if a firm has the ability to maintain investment in fixed capital by adjusting working capital, the 
coefficient of the cash flow variable would capture shifts in investment demand. One implication of this line of 
argument is that reduced form models underestimate the impact of financing constraints on investment (see 
Fazzari and Petersen, 1993, for details). 
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where θ and μ capture time and firm (or industry) fixed effects, and ε is the i.i.d. error term. This 
regression model, therefore, defines the efficient investment function (frontier). In the presence of 
financing constraints, the observed investment-to-capital ratio is less than the efficient (optimal) 
investment-to-capital ratio in [2]. Thus, the difference between this efficient investment-to-capital 
ratio and the observed investment-to-capital ratio is attributed to financing constraint. This difference 
can be represented by a non-negative term u. More specifically, we write the observed investment-to-
capital ratio as:  
�
Iit
Ki,t-1� = � IitKi,t-1�SF exp (-uit)  ⇒   l𝑛 � 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1� =  l𝑛 � 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1�𝑆𝐹 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡   [3] 
Models [2] and [3] together define the stochastic frontier formulation of the investment function, and 
can be estimated using certain distributional assumptions on u and ε. Specifically, ε is the normally 
distributed i.i.d. term, while u has a half normal distribution (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
It is evident that the stochastic frontier approach gives us not only the estimates of the 
parameters of the investment function but observation-specific estimates of the one-sided investment 
efficiency term u as well, and therein lies the key to the application of stochastic frontier approach to 
the literature on firm-level financing constraints. The higher the value of u greater is the impact of 
constraints on investment. Thus, in the present case, the frontier represents the desired investment 
function which is unobserved and the u term represents a firm’s inability to attain the investment 
frontier, ceteris paribus, due to the presence of financing constraints. Specifically, from u, we are able 
to generate a score for investment efficiency, the equivalent of the technical efficiency measure for a 
production function (i.e., exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡) ), which is bounded within (0, 1). Aside from the ease of 
interpretation – higher investment efficiency implies lower financing constraints, the investment 
efficiency score has the advantage that it captures the combined impact of all the constraining 
variables on the extent of credit constraint. By contrast, alternative methodologies such as OLS or 
fixed effects panel regression models captures only the marginal impact of individual firm 
characteristics on investment of the average firm, and hence do not tell us whether or not an 
individual firm is credit constrained overall, and if so by how much, relative to the frontier. With the 
stochastic frontier approach, therefore, it is possible to examine distributions of the extent of financing 
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constraints of the firms from the efficiency scores, and compare distributions of financing constraints 
(or investment efficiency) across firm types, industries and regions, and over time.5 
 
4.3 Empirical strategy and data 
Our analysis proceeds in two stages.  
• First, we estimate variations of the stylised model outlined in equation [1] and examine the 
sign and significance of the coefficient of the cash flow variable. As mentioned above, a 
positive and significant estimate of this coefficient should indicate presence of financing 
constraints. We estimate equation [1] using both OLS and panel fixed effects models. In the 
case of the former, the standard errors are clustered to account for possible correlations of 
investment within firms over time. In order to distinguish between the pre-crisis period and 
the crisis period (2008-10), we include in the specifications of the OLS and fixed effects 
models both a dummy variable for the crisis years, and an interaction between this dummy 
variable and the cash flow variable. 
• Next, we estimate the stochastic frontier models described by equations [2] and [3]. This 
enables us to generate measures of the efficiency with which firm characteristics such as 
current and past sales are translated into investment, and hence measures of financing 
constraints. Since these measures of financing constraints (alternatively, investment 
efficiency) are generated for all firm-years using the same frontier equation, we are able to 
compare these measures across industries and regions, as well as over time. 
• Finally, under the restrictive assumption that growth in a certain period is indicative of growth 
in future periods, we examine how the investment efficiencies of firms in the four (sales) 
growth quartiles for the 2001-2003 period compare over the 2003-2010 period. In particular, 
we are interested in whether faster growing firms (i.e., those in the highest growth quartile 
during 2001-2003) experience greater financing constraints that other firms during the 
subsequent years. 
                                                          
5 See Bhaumik et al. (2012) for further discussion of the advantages of the stochastic frontier approach. 
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For our analysis, we use firm level data from FAME, which is a much used source of firm 
level data for the UK. One of the weaknesses of FAME is that the data are self-reported and hence 
there is a high incidence of missing information for a large number of firms. In particular, data on 
Tobin’s q are not available for more than 1000 firm-years. Hence, for the stochastic frontier part of 
our analysis, we have modelled investment-to-capital ratio of firms as a function of current and past 
sales alone: 
 l𝑛 � 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1�
𝑆𝐹 = 𝛼 + 𝛾 l𝑛 �𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 � + 𝛿 l𝑛 �𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2 � + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        [2a] 
To begin with, we control for only the shock of the crisis years (2008-2010) using a dummy. Laterm 
we add controls for individual years and industries – initially NACE 2-digit and later NACE 4-digit – 
to account for time and industry fixed effects. 
 
INSERT Table 1 about here. 
 
 The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. After accounting for missing values, 
observations with negative values of the relevant variables, and improbable values of the investment-
to-capital ratio that are greater than 1, we are left with an unbalanced panel of 114,861 firm years. The 
descriptive statistics suggest that the average investment-to-sales ratio has not changed significantly 
between 2003 and 2010. However, both the average sales-to-capital ratio and the cash flow-to-capital 
ratio increased by about 150 percent over the same period. Finally, the average firm size, as captured 
by the value of fixed assets, is fairly small, but the large standard deviation indicates that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in firm size within the sample. 
 
3. Regression results 
In Table 2, we report the results for the stylised model (equation [1]). We estimate the model using 
both OLS with clustered standard errors to account for correlations within firms across years, and 
panel fixed effects. We estimate the model with the basic specification in which investment is 
determined by sales (models 1 and 4), the extended and (from our point of view) the extended model 
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that includes cash flow and (log) assets (models 2 and 5), and a further extension in which the 
specification includes a dummy for the crisis years (2008-2010) and an interaction between this 
dummy and cash flows (models 3 and 6). The intuition for models 3 and 6 is that cash flow sensitivity 
of investment might differ significantly between pre-crisis and crisis years. From the point of view of 
signs and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, the results are remarkably robust across 
specifications and estimation methods. 
 
INSERT Table 2 about here. 
 
To recapitulate, in this stylised approach, the average firm is said to experience financing 
constraints if the coefficient of the cash flow variable is positive and significant. The results reported 
in the table suggest that the average firm in the sample did not experience financing constraint during 
the sample period; the estimated coefficient of the cash flow variable is negative.6 Indeed, while the 
cash flow sensitivity of investment during the crisis years was different compared to that in pre-crisis 
years, the sensitivity was even more negative during the former. The coefficients of the other 
variables are consistent with expectations (see Bhaumik et al., 2012): current sales and investment are 
positively related while past sales and investment have a negative relationship, and investment-to-
capital ratio is higher for larger firms. Importantly, the dummy for the crisis years does not have a 
significant coefficient, indicating that there was no secular impact of the crisis on the investment-to-
capital ratio of the firms in the sample. This is consistent with the cross-year values of the average 
investment-to-capital ratio reported in Table 1. 
 
INSERT Table 3 about here. 
 
                                                          
6 It is difficult to interpret a negative coefficient for the cash flow variable. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) 
have argued that when firms are particularly distressed and have negative cash flows, they cannot cut back 
investment beyond some point, and this may drive an estimated negative relationship. While that still does not 
explain a negative coefficient during a “normal” year, a negative coefficient of a very small magnitude can 
perhaps simply be interpreted as not indicating presence of financing constraint. 
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Next, we estimate the stochastic frontier model outlined in equation [2a]. The regression 
estimates are reported in Table 3. We report the estimates for four different specifications: the basic 
specification in which investment is determined by sales (model 1), one in which we control for the 
crisis years (model 2), one in which we control for unobserved year effects (model 3), and finally one 
in which we control for both unobserved year and (NACE 2-digit) industry effects. As discussed 
earlier in the paper, stochastic frontier analysis generates a firm-year specific (0, 1) bounded measure 
of investment efficiency; financing constraint decreases with this efficiency measure.7 In Figure 2, we 
report the estimates of investment efficiency generated by the four specifications. It is easily seen that 
the distributions of efficiency generated by the models are remarkably similar. Indeed, they have 
similar means and standard deviations, and are also highly correlated. Hence, for the subsequent 
analysis, we can use any of these four measures of investment efficiency. We use the efficiency 
measures generated by model 1. 
 
INSERT Figure 2 about here. 
 
 In Table 4, we report the means, standard deviations, and maximum and minimum values for 
investment efficiency across years. The descriptive statistics suggest that the average values of the 
efficiency measure were quite similar across the years – if anything, average efficiency actually 
increased during 2009 and 2010.  Note that our estimates of investment efficiency is based on firm-
year observations for the entire 2003-2010 period, i.e., these estimates are based on the same 
underlying efficient frontier. Under the reasonable assumption that firms did not, on average, 
experience significant financing constraint during the pre-crisis years, the observation that investment 
efficiency (and hence the degree of financing constraint) is similar for the pre-crisis and crisis years, is 
consistent with the result from the stylised model, namely, that there is no financing constraint for the 
average firm in the sample. The descriptive statistics also indicate that there is considerable variation 
                                                          
7 Note that since our measures of investment efficiency are generated from a single frontier model for the entire 
sample period, they can be compared across firm years. Hence, even though investment efficiency measures are, 
by their very nature, relative to an unobserved efficient frontier, since the frontier is the same for all firm-years, 
the efficiency measure for all firm-years is generated relative to the same frontier. 
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in the efficiency measure across firms, during each of the years in the sample period. The efficiency 
measure ranged from 0.57 to 0.82 for all these years. 
 
INSERT Table 4 about here. 
 
 Next, we examine whether there is noticeable variation in the average measure of investment 
efficiency across 2-digit industries and regions. In Table 5, we report the average value of the 
estimated investment efficiency across regions in the United Kingdom, and across years. In Table 6, 
we report the average value of the efficiency measure across 2-digit industries, and across years. Since 
an average is not a meaningful statistic for very small samples, in Table 6, we report average values of 
investment efficiency for only those 2-digit industries for which we have at least 10 firms for all (or 
most) of the years. The averages reported in Table 5 indicate that average investment efficiency of 
firms was fairly similar across regions, and remarkably stable over the years. Importantly, there was 
no noticeable decline in average investment efficiency during the crisis years in any of the years; 
average investment efficiency was marginally above trend in 2009 and 2010. Similarly, the averages 
for the industry-years reported in Table 6 indicate that while there are modest inter-industry 
differences in average investment efficiency for any given year, and modest differences in average 
efficiency for any one industry across years, the differences are not significant. 
 
INSERT Tables 5 and 6 about here. 
 
 Finally, in Table 7, we explore the relationship between firm growth and investment 
efficiency. Since contemporaneous growth rates of firms are almost certainly endogenous to the 
extent of financing constraints, we focus on the growth rates of firms for the 2001-2003 period, the 
first three years for which data are available for a reasonably large sample of firms. We then separate 
the firms into four quartiles, on the basis of their 2001-2003 growth rates. High growth firms are 
likely to roughly correspond to the firms in the highest growth quartile (quartile 4). As before, we 
report the average investment efficiencies for the firms in the four quartiles for each of the years in the 
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sample period. Since we have an unbalanced panel, and not all firms for which we can compute the 
growth rate for the 2001-2003 period are present in the sample for each of the years, for the sake of 
completeness we also report the average efficiency measure for these other firms. We notice two 
things: First, for each of the years, average investment efficiency is marginally higher for the fastest 
and slowest growing firms in the 2001-2003 cohort, than for the firms with intermediate rates of 
growth. It is reasonable to speculate therefore that the future growth of these latter firms, which are 
potentially high growth firms of the future, might find their growth restrained on account of financing 
constraint. Second, average investment efficiency of firms in the 2001-2003 cohort decrease over 
time, for all quartiles, even as there is an increase in the average efficiency of the other firms. 
 
INSERT Table 7 about here. 
 
 Taken together, the results suggest that the degree of financing constraint experienced by the 
average British firm was not significantly different between the pre-crisis years and the crisis years of 
2008-2010. The average investment efficiency measure has a value of about 0.70 across years, across 
industries and across regions. This estimate of investment efficiency itself does not permit us to make 
an absolute statement about whether or not a the average firm was financially constrained. However, 
as we have argued earlier, under the reasonable assumption that the average firm did not experience 
financing constraint during the pre-crisis years, our results suggest that there is no prima facie 
evidence of significant financing constraint among British firms during the 2003-2010 period – 
importantly not even during the crisis years of 2008-2010, on average. However, as noted above, the 
distributions of investment efficiency suggest that there are considerable variations in this efficiency 
across firms during any one year. We interpret this as suggesting that policies aimed at alleviating 
financing constraints in firms would not be useful if they target broad categories such as firms in 
certain industries or within certain regions. The extent of financing constraints is likely driven by 
firm-specific factors that may or may not vary systematically with the measure of investment 
efficiency.  
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INSERT Figure 3 about here. 
 
We explore the possible relationship between one such firm-specific characteristics, namely, 
size, and the measure of investment efficiency. In Figure 3, we report the scatter plots of the 
investment efficiency and fixed assets of firms, for 2003 (the first and pre-crisis year) and 2010 (the 
last and crisis year). In the graphs to the left, we include all firms in the sample, for the respective 
years. In the graphs to the right, we restrict the sample to firms with less than £500,000 in assets. In 
either case, there is no discernible pattern for the relationship between firm size and investment 
efficiency. Hence, even when targeting policies based on firm characteristics, policy makers may have 
to look beyond obvious (and easily observable) characteristics such as size. This is consistent with a 
finding of the Q1 2012 SME Finance Monitor, which states that (for SMEs) the likelihood of success 
for new loan and overdraft applications is significantly determined by “performance of the account” 
(pp. 10) (i.e., bounced cheques, missed loan repayments etc) and by “demonstrated means of financial 
capability” (pp. 10) such as presence of qualified personnel dedicated to management of the firms’ 
financial affairs. 
As in the case of any empirical analysis, our results are subject to two important caveats. 
First, on account of paucity of data for Tobin’s q, we were not able to include it in our regression 
specification. Hence, even though we control for unobserved industry-specific factors, our 
specification s may lack a forward-looking component. Second, once missing data etc are taken into 
account, we have a sample that accounts for 10 percent (or fewer) firms of the FAME population. 
Hence, the distribution of our sample across industries, firm sizes etc may not be representative of the 
respective distributions for the underlying population of firms in the United Kingdom. However, our 
results provide important evidence about the extent of financing constraints among British firms 
across a wide range of industries and over a number of years. Importantly, we are able to provide a 
comparable measure of this constraint (via investment efficiency) across firm-years. Further, the 
result about the absence of significant financing constraint for the average firm is remarkably 
consistent across choice of methodologies and specifications. Also, the key insight that financing 
constraints in firms may be driven largely by firm-specific factors such as credit risk and 
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organisational capacity that are not easily observed is consistent with other available evidence on 
financing constraints of British firms. This gives us confidence about broad implications of our 
results, discussed above. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Inadequate access to financial resources is viewed as an impediment to growth of firms, and a popular 
view is that financing constraint is adversely affecting growth of firms (and the private sector) in the 
United Kingdom. In this paper, we address this policy issue using a stylised methodology that relies 
on estimates of the cash flow sensitivity of firms’ investment, as well as a relatively new methodology 
that enables us to generate a measure of investment efficiency of firms, i.e., the efficiency with which 
firms can convert their sales into investment, after controlling for unobserved year- and industry-
specific effects. This measure of investment efficiency, which is bounded between 0 and 1, permits us 
to compare the extent of financing constraints across firm-years, and hence across time, industries and 
regions. 
 Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in investment efficiency across 
firms, during a given year; the range being 0.57-0.82. However, the average investment efficiency 
measure is similar across years, regions and NACE 2-digit industries. We also do not find discernible 
patterns in the relationship between investment efficiency and firm size, both before and during the 
financial crisis. The results suggest that while some firms are clearly less efficient at translating their 
performance into investment, broad policies targeting firms of a certain size, or those within a 
particular industry or region, may not successfully address the problem of financing constraint in the 
United Kingdom. The targeting of firms with financing constraints may have to be considerably more 
refined, and look at not easily observable factors such as credit history/events and organisational 
capacity of the firms. 
 Our results should be interpreted with care. On account of the quality of available data, we 
were not able to fully use the stylised specification – specifically, include Tobin’s q in the 
specification – and the distributions of the sample we use may not be representative of the 
distributions of the underlying firm population. But our results are robust. Further, the regression 
14 
 
estimates and the key insight about the importance of not easily observable factors are consistent with 
the literature on financing constraints and other available evidence on financing constraints of British 
firms. Hence, our results should provide a strong basis for further (and perhaps more refined) policy 
debate about financing constraints of firms in the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 1. Credit growth in the United Kingdom 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Investment-to-capital ratio 0.24 
(0.22) 
0.25 
(0.23) 
0.27 
(0.24) 
0.29 
(0.23) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.33 
(0.21) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
Sales-to-capital ratio 40.34 
(662.06) 
58.05 
(110.69) 
73.37 
(624.21) 
53.72 
(319.77) 
77.01 
(925.14) 
115.96 
(1122.36) 
111.28 
(2897.89) 
105.96 
(1835.44) 
Cash flow-to-capital ratio 1.34 
(15.51) 
2.10 
(18.30) 
2.40 
(32.23) 
2.55 
(27.54) 
3.80 
(65.49) 
3.98 
(62.74) 
3.77 
(53.06) 
3.17 
(33.72) 
Fixed assets (£) 20433.87 
(224009.20) 
16583.55 
(204269.60) 
12863.70 
(153357.20) 
23658.52 
(254512.60) 
16613.30 
(200041.70) 
10224.27 
(153724.60) 
22640.69 
(255965.60) 
8312.52 
(64683.02) 
No. of obs. 15480 13730 12983 18654 15186 11693 18792 8351 
Note: This table reports the means and standard deviations of the variables used for the analysis. The latter are reported within parentheses. 
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Table 2 
Stylised regression models 
 
 OLS with clustered std. error Fixed effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Sales-to-capital ratio   0.06 ***   (0.00) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.14 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.00) 
Lagged sales-to-capital 
ratio 
- 0.02 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.02 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.02 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.01 
  (0.00) 
- 0.02 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.02 *** 
  (0.00) 
Cash flow-to-capital 
ratio  
- 0.0001 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.00001 
  (0.00)  
- 0.0003 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.0001 ** 
  (0.00) 
(Log) fixed assets    0.005 ***   (0.00) 
  0.005 *** 
  (0.00)  
  0.13 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.13 *** 
  (0.00) 
Crisis year dummy     0.01 ***   (0.00)   
- 0.001 
  (0.00) 
Crisis year dummy × 
Cash flow-to-capital   
- 0.0001 *** 
  (0.00)   
- 0.0002 *** 
  (0.00) 
Constant   0.16 ***   (0.00) 
  0.11 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.11 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 0.05 *** 
  (0.00) 
- 1.21 *** 
  (0.01) 
- 1.21 *** 
  (0.01) 
       
No. of observations   114861   114861   114861   114861   114861   114861 
Number of firms   36934   36934   36934   36934   36934   36934 
F-statistics   3234.47 ***   1634.60 ***   1119.63 ***   3848.45 ***   3796.80 ***   2536.75 *** 
R-squared   0.08   0.08   0.08   0.07   0.02   0.02 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the stylised regression model (equation [1]). The values within parentheses are standard errors. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent levels. For fixed effect models, we report the overall R-square. In this model, the average firm in the sample is considered to be 
experiencing financing constraint if the coefficient of the cash flow variable is positive and significant. In the case of our sample, this coefficient is either 
insignificant or negative, for both the pre-crisis and crisis years. In other words, our regression results do not indicate presence of financing constraint for the 
average firm for either the pre-crisis or the crisis years. 
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Table 3 
Investment efficiency - frontier equation 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.069 *** 
  (0.001) 
  0.069 *** 
  (0.001) 
  0.073 *** 
  (0.001) 
  0.074 *** 
  (0.001) 
Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2) - 0.026 *** 
  (0.001) 
- 0.026 *** 
  (0.001) 
- 0.028 *** 
  (0.001) 
- 0.028 *** 
  (0.001) 
Crisis dummy    0.015 *** 
  (0.001) 
  
Constant   0.661 
  (8.097) 
  0.655 
  (7.611) 
  0.634 
  (4.85) 
  0.614 
  (7.585) 
Year dummies   No   No   Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies   No   No   No   Yes 
     
Log likelihood   8451.84   8512.71   9746.42   10305.54 
Wald chi-square   8759.43 ***   8901.67 ***   11447.51 ***   12839.07 *** 
Gamma   0.113 
  (0.030) 
  0.113 
  (0.003) 
  0.127 
  (0.003) 
  0.113 
  (0.003) 
Number of firms   36934   36934   36934   36721 
Number of obs.   114861   114861   114861   113764 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the stochastic frontier model (equation [2a]). The values 
within parentheses are standard errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Models 3 and 4 
control for NACE 2-digit industry fixed effects. Theoretically, for a frontier to exist, gamma should 
have a value between zero and one. On the basis of these estimates, we generate firm-year specific 
estimates of investment efficiency which lies between 0 and 1. If the investment efficiency of a firm is 
close to 1 then it experiences very little financing constraint, and vice versa. 
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Figure 2 
Estimates of investment efficiency 
 
 
 
 Descriptive 
statistics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model 1   0.716 
  (0.042) 1.00    
Model 2   0.716 
  (0.042) 0.99 1.00   
Model 3   0.717 
  (0.045) 0.99 0.99 1.00  
Model 4   0.721 
  (0.041) 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 
Notes: The values within parentheses are standard deviations of the investment efficiency estimates 
generated from the stochastic frontier models (Table 3). The values in columns 2-5 are correlation 
coefficients. Since the correlation among the investment efficiency estimates generated by the four 
models is high, we can use any one of these measures for our analysis. For the rest of the analysis, 
therefore, we use the estimates of investment efficiency generated by Model 1. 
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Table 4 
Investment efficiency across time 
 
 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
2003 15480 0.713 0.039 0.575 0.819 
2004 13730 0.708 0.039 0.575 0.823 
2005 12983 0.708 0.040 0.575 0.823 
2006 18654 0.717 0.040 0.575 0.822 
2007 15186 0.713 0.041 0.575 0.822 
2008 11693 0.716 0.044 0.575 0.823 
2009 18792 0.726 0.044 0.575 0.822 
2010 8351 0.724 0.049 0.575 0.818 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the estimates of investment efficiency across 
years. The average values of the efficiency measure were quite similar across the sample years – if 
anything, average efficiency actually increased during 2009 and 2010.  Under the reasonable 
assumption that firms did not, on average, experience significant financing constraint during the pre-
crisis years, the observation that investment efficiency (and hence the degree of financing constraint) 
is similar for the pre-crisis and crisis years, it is possible to argue that there is no financing constraint 
for the average firm in the sample. The range of values for investment efficiency also indicate that 
there is considerable variation in the efficiency measure across firms, during each of the years in the 
sample period. 
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Table 5 
Investment efficiency across regions 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
East Midlands 0.706 0.699 0.699 0.708 0.704 0.704 0.718 0.720 
East of England 0.711 0.705 0.703 0.712 0.709 0.713 0.722 0.720 
London 0.716 0.713 0.715 0.722 0.719 0.723 0.732 0.725 
North East 0.711 0.705 0.703 0.716 0.713 0.719 0.728 0.730 
North West 0.710 0.704 0.706 0.715 0.711 0.711 0.725 0.723 
Northern Ireland 0.716 0.709 0.705 0.715 0.708 0.715 0.728 0.751 
Scotland 0.716 0.708 0.708 0.717 0.711 0.717 0.726 0.727 
South East 0.712 0.707 0.707 0.716 0.712 0.716 0.724 0.720 
South West 0.710 0.706 0.706 0.714 0.710 0.714 0.724 0.724 
Wales 0.709 0.702 0.704 0.712 0.711 0.710 0.720 0.724 
West Midlands 0.708 0.702 0.702 0.713 0.708 0.709 0.721 0.721 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 0.709 0.734 0.705 0.712 0.707 0.708 0.720 0.723 
Notes: This table reports the average investment efficiency of firms for each region in each of the 
sample years. These numbers suggest that average investment efficiency of firms was fairly similar 
across regions, and remarkably stable over the years. Importantly, there was no noticeable decline in 
average investment efficiency during the crisis years in any of the years; average investment 
efficiency was marginally above trend in 2009 and 2010. 
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Table 6 
Investment efficiency across 2-digit industries 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 0.714 0.702 0.698 0.714 0.705 0.705 0.721 0.731 
11 0.716 0.718 0.724 0.725 0.730 0.735 0.739 0.729 
14 0.713 0.709 0.704 0.713 0.711 0.709 0.716 0.712 
15 0.696 0.696 0.692 0.701 0.692 0.694 0.708 0.712 
17 0.702 0.702 0.698 0.717 0.701 0.689 0.712 0.723 
18 0.698 0.698 0.699 0.705 0.690 0.689 0.697 0.717 
19 0.695 0.695 0.691 0.696 0.705 0.693 0.700 0.712# 
20 0.696 0.696 0.692 0.702 0.694 0.684 0.720 0.718 
21 0.704 0.704 0.703 0.711 0.699 0.696 0.718 0.717 
22 0.708 0.708 0.709 0.713 0.707 0.705 0.718 0.718 
23 0.691 0.691 0.687# 0.702 0.688 0.670 0.718 0.705# 
24 0.699 0.698 0.696 0.707 0.698 0.701 0.714 0.711 
25 0.703 0.703 0.697 0.706 0.699 0.691 0.712 0.707 
26 0.704 0.704 0.701 0.707 0.697 0.696 0.713 0.716 
27 0.695 0.695 0.687 0.700 0.695 0.698 0.705 0.703 
28 0.696 0.695 0.695 0.707 0.699 0.695 0.711 0.715 
29 0.695 0.695 0.694 0.703 0.700 0.701 0.713 0.712 
30 0.711 0.711 0.715 0.712 0.709 0.706 0.715 0.711 
31 0.699 0.698 0.697 0.704 0.700 0.702 0.711 0.712 
32 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.704 0.702 0.700 0.709 0.708 
33 0.702 0.702 0.704 0.709 0.705 0.707 0.720 0.713 
34 0.695 0.695 0.688 0.698 0.695 0.697 0.708 0.693 
35 0.697 0.696 0.699 0.705 0.703 0.697 0.714 0.694 
36 0.699 0.699 0.698 0.706 0.699 0.698 0.711 0.719 
37 0.707 0.706 0.712 0.714 0.723 0.737 0.748 0.760 
40 0.707 0.706 0.715 0.731 0.721 0.727 0.739 0.720 
41 0.725   0.709# 0.709# 0.727 0.716 0.727 0.726   
45 0.703 0.703 0.702 0.709 0.707 0.706 0.717 0.724 
50 0.702 0.701 0.697 0.708 0.698 0.699 0.714 0.712 
51 0.699 0.699 0.698 0.706 0.700 0.702 0.712 0.717 
52 0.707 0.707 0.708 0.716 0.712 0.715 0.724 0.712 
55 0.713 0.713 0.715 0.729 0.717 0.721 0.737 0.728 
60 0.706 0.706 0.705 0.711 0.707 0.704 0.715 0.723 
61 0.712 0.712 0.716 0.730 0.728 0.738 0.741 0.717 
62 0.713 0.712 0.714 0.721 0.719 0.721 0.723 0.717# 
63 0.705 0.704 0.701 0.709 0.704 0.706 0.718 0.706 
64 0.726 0.725 0.727 0.727 0.729 0.733 0.735 0.724 
65 0.720 0.720 0.721 0.728 0.725 0.729 0.737 0.730 
66 0.719 0.719 0.722 0.723 0.722 0.723 0.738 0.725 
67 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.732 0.729 0.732 0.742 0.734 
70 0.723 0.722 0.725 0.737 0.727 0.732 0.747 0.733 
71 0.713 0.713 0.710 0.714 0.713 0.712 0.723 0.725 
25 
 
72 0.721 0.721 0.723 0.727 0.726 0.729 0.733 0.731 
73 0.726 0.726 0.723 0.731 0.732 0.730 0.737 0.739 
74 0.715 0.715 0.716 0.724 0.724 0.728 0.737 0.734 
75 0.725 0.725 0.723 0.736 0.739 0.739 0.745 0.746# 
80 0.718 0.718 0.716 0.722 0.717 0.723 0.727 0.732 
85 0.714 0.714 0.715 0.728 0.724 0.725 0.740 0.732 
90 0.712 0.711 0.710 0.714 0.714 0.720 0.728 0.751 
91 0.720 0.720 0.726 0.730 0.727 0.728 0.734 0.727 
92 0.715 0.715 0.713 0.722 0.718 0.723 0.729 0.723 
93 0.712 0.711 0.708 0.721 0.715 0.717 0.729 0.729 
Notes: This table reports the average investment efficiency of firms for a number of NACE 2-digit 
industries, in each of the sample years. The # sign indicates that the sample has fewer than 10 firms. 
The numbers indicate that while there are modest inter-industry differences in average investment 
efficiency for any given year, and modest differences in average efficiency for any one industry 
across years, the differences are not significant. 
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Table 7 
Investment efficiency across 2003 growth quartiles 
 
 Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 Others 
2003 0.721 0.710 0.712 0.722 0.711 
2004 0.713 0.701 0.703 0.717 0.710 
2005 0.709 0.696 0.699 0.715 0.713 
2006 0.711 0.703 0.704 0.716 0.724 
2007 0.703 0.693 0.696 0.709 0.710 
2008 0.705 0.690 0.692 0.705 0.726 
2009 0.707 0.699 0.701 0.712 0.736 
2010 0.690 0.681 0.687 0.702 0.736 
Notes: This table reports the average investment efficiency of firms for the four growth quartiles The 
quartiles refer to the quartiles of 3-year (2001-2003) average of firm growth in 2003. Others refer to 
firms that were not in the 2003 cohort. The numbers suggest that, for each of the years, average 
investment efficiency is marginally higher for the fastest and slowest growing firms in the 2001-2003 
cohort, than for the firms with intermediate rates of growth. It is reasonable to speculate therefore that 
the future growth of these latter firms, which are potentially high growth firms of the future, might 
find their growth restrained on account of financing constraint. Further, average investment efficiency 
of firms in the 2001-2003 cohort decrease over time, for all quartiles, even as there is an increase in 
the average efficiency of the other firms. 
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Figure 3 
Scatter plot of fixed assets against investment efficiency 
 
  
 
   
Notes: In this figure, we report the scatter plots of the investment efficiency and fixed assets of firms, 
for 2003 (the first and pre-crisis year) and 2010 (the last and crisis year). In the graphs to the left, we 
include all firms in the sample, for the respective years. In the graphs to the right, we restrict the 
sample to firms with less than £500,000 in assets. In either case, there is no discernible pattern for the 
relationship between firm size and investment efficiency. Hence, even when targeting policies based 
on firm characteristics, policy makers may have to look beyond obvious (and easily observable) 
characteristics such as size. 
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